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A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons
Congress Added Sex to Title VII and Their
Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth
Michael Evan Gold
Sex is the Cinderella of Title VII. The conventional view is that sex
was added as a protected class to the employment discrimination title
of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 (Act) for the purpose of defeating it by
making it unacceptable to some of its supporters or by laughing it to
death. Norbert A. Schlei, who in 1963 was the Assistant Attorney
General of the United States in charge of the Justice Department's Of-
fice of Legal Counsel, wrote in the foreword to a leading treatise on
the law of employment discrimination:
On the House floor, Title VII was amended by its enemies to add sex
as a prohibited basis of discrimination. The amendment, offered by Judge
Howard Smith of Virginia, then Chairman of the Rules Committee, was
adopted by a majority most whose of members voted against the legislation
as a whole. The fact that the prohibition of discrimination based on sex
has probably had a greater impact than anything else in the legislation il-
lustrates the hazards of the strategy followed by the bill's Southern op-
ponents in the House.'
This view is' espoused by the author of an excellent casebook on
employment discrimination law.' It appears in the Harvard Law
© Copyright 1980 Michael Evan Gold
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1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. I 1977, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. I 1979)).
2. N. Schlei, Foreword to B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Law as xi-xii (1976) [hereinafter cited as Foreword] (emphasis in original). The Congres-
sional Record shows the Smith amendment was agreed to by a vote of 168 to 133, 110
CONG. REC. 2584 (1964), but does not identify the voters by name. It is mathematically
possible that a majority of the 168 Representatives who voted for the amendment voted
against the civil rights bill because 130 votes were cast against the bill. Id. at 2804-05.
3. A. SMITH, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 327 (1978); Smith, The Law and
Equal Employment Opportunity: What's Past Should Not Be Prologue, 33 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REv. 493, 504 (1980).
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Review' and in popular books.5 Even judges repeat it.' And it is wrong.
It has misled at least one court to state, "Congress in all probability
did not intend for its proscription of sexual discrimination to have
significant and sweeping implications.17 In hopes of saving future deci-
sions from being influenced by this error, the following discussion will
show that sex was added to Title VII for serious reasons and, accord-
ingly (except in those cases in which sex is a bona fide occupational
qualification),' under the Act women deserve as complete protection
from discrimination based on sex as do blacks from discrimination based
on race and Hispanics from discrimination based on national origin.
I. THE GENESIS OF THE BAN ON SEX DISCRIMINATION
To know why sex was added to Title VII, it is important to under-
stand why sex was not in the civil rights bill from the start. The sim-
ple reason is that Title VII itself was not in the bill from the start. The
explanation is twofold. First, the civil rights movement had focused on
segregation in public accommodations and public schools, rather than
on discrimination in factories and businesses.' Second, emotion ran
especially high on the issue of employment. It was one thing to tell a
public school, which was supported by tax money, that it could not
discriminate against blacks; and perhaps it was similar to tell a
restaurant or hotel, which held itself open to the transient public, that
it could not discriminate; but it seemed quite another thing to tell an
4. Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1167 (1971). Contra, Miller, Sex Discrimination
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877, 883-85 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Miller].
5. See, e.g., C. BIRD, BORN FEMALE ch. 1 (1968).
6. See, e.g., County of Washington v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623, 4631 n.4 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
7. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975).
8. A recent discussion of the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) unfor-
tunately repeats the common explanations of the legislative history of the addition of sex
to Title VII; see Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1027 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Sirota].
Although Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire an individual on the basis of
an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(a) (1976),
employment choices may be made on the basis of an individual's religion, sex, or national
origin in those instances where one of these attributes constitutes "a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(e)(1) (1976).
9. J. GOULDEN, MEANY 320 (1972) [hereinafter cited as MEANY]. In 1963 there were
2,100 civil rights demonstrations. Two-thirds were directed at places of public accomoda-
tion, and the balance were related to public facilities. 110 CONG. REC. 7668 (1964) (remarks
of Sen. Javits).
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employer who operated a private enterprise that he could not choose
whom to employ, work with, and rely on for his livelihood. The Ken-
nedy administration feared that a fair employment practices (FEP) ti-
tle would drive moderate support away from its comprehensive civil
rights bill,10 which the administration wanted enacted as soon as
possible11 in response to racial tension in the South.' Accordingly,
when President Kennedy sent his first special message on civil rights
to the 88th Congress, he mentioned racial discrimination by unions, but
not by employers, and requested no legislation on private
employment. 3
Four months later, in his second special message on civil rights,
President Kennedy told Congress, "I renew my support of pending
Federal fair employment practices legislation, applicable to both
employers and unions."" The value of this support was unclear,
however. In the first place, there was pending at the time:
a plethora of civil rights bills. Some included comprehensive provisions
relating to all areas of civic and economic life . . . others dealt primarily
with equal employment opportunity .... The proposed methods of en-
forcement ran the gamut-from those providing for a strong ad-
ministrative agency, like the NLRB ... to those providing simply for con-
ciliation and persuasion or merely further study and recommendations."
In the face of such a variety of proposals, the President's general sup-
port was tantamount to no support at all. Moreover, the Kennedy ad-
ministration's own civil rights bill, H.R. 7152, was introduced by
Representative Celler of New York on the day after the President's
second special message." Title VII of this bill authorized the President
only to establish a Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity,
whose primary function would be to prevent discrimination by recip-
ients of federal grants, contractors with the federal government, and
the federal government itself.7 If Title VII of H.R. 7152 was the
10. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); see note 16 and accompanying text infra.
11. MEANY, supra note 9, at 320.
12. In June of 1963, President Kennedy addressed both the country and Congress
concerning the "rising tide of discontent that threaten[ed] the public safety." He stressed
the immediacy of the problem because "the events in Birmingham and elsewhere [had] so
increased the cries for equality that no city or State legislative body [could] prudently
choose to ignore them." 109 CONG. REC. 11,174 (1963). See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative
History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 431, 432 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Vaas].
13. See Vaas, supra note 12, at 432.
14. 109 CONG. REC. 11,178 (1963), reprinted in Vaas, supra note 12, at 433.
15. Vaas, supra note 12, at 433.
16. H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). Representative Celler of New York
presented the bill on June 20, 1963. It was then directly referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary. 109 CONG. REC. 11,252 (1963); see Vaas, supra note 12, at 434.
17. See Vaas, supra note 12, at 434.
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measure of the Kennedy administration's support for FEP legislation,
that support was lean, indeed.
That an FEP title on private employment appeared later in the bill
and enjoyed the administration's blessing was due to the insistence of
the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations. According to its president, George Meany, the AFL-CIO
wanted an FEP title in the law for two reasons:
First, we need the statutory support of the federal government to
carry out the unanimously adopted principles of the AFL-CIO....
Why is this so? Primarily because the labor movement is not what its
enemies say it is-a monolithic, dictatorial, centralized body that imposes
its will on the helpless dues payers. We operate in a democratic way, and
we cannot dictate even in a good cause....
Second, we want federal legislation because we are tired of being the
whipping boy in this area ... [while] the employers-who actually do the
hiring-escape in many instances with no criticism whatever.18
When Andrew Biemiller, the AFL-CIO's chief lobbyist, presented the
idea of an FEP title to President Kennedy, the President "kept saying,
'You are going to ruin my bill, you are going to ruin the whole thing.'
He kept quoting statistics about black unemployment and what great
progress had been made. I told him, 'I'm sorry, but this is our line, and
we are going to carry though on it."'19 Because the support of organized
labor was critical to the passage of the entire civil rights bill," and
because labor would not have worked so hard for a bill without an
FEP title as it did for a bill with an FEP title,21 the administration
agreed to incorporate a title on private employment.
As George Meany's statement above demonstrates, labor's concern
was race discrimination. Neither labor-nor, indeed, most of
America- considered sex discrimination to be a problem at all, let
alone a problem of magnitude equal to race discrimination. Even
women's groups, which were sensitive to sex discrimination and which
had been pushing for reform,' gave the problem of race discrimination
a higher priority.' Thus, Title VII did not contain a ban on sex
discrimination at the outset, not because the Kennedy administration
believed a sex clause was unworthy or unneeded, but because the para-
mount issue of the day was race discrimination. If the administration
had cause to fear an FEP title for blacks would be too much for Con-
18. MEANY. supra note 9, at 320-21.
19. Id. at 320.
20. Id- at 322.
21. Id. at 320, 322-23.
22. See 110 CONG. REc. 2582 (1964) (remarks of Rep. May), quoted in the text accom-
panying note 68 infra.
23. See text accompanying notes 37-40 infra.
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gress to accept, how much more cause it would have had to fear an
FEP title with a sex clause! As it turned out, of course, the administra-
tion's fears were unfounded. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, in-
cluding the FEP title, and it added a sex clause as well. The sex clause
was debated briefly in the House of Representatives.2 In the Senate,
however, although the bill was debated for eighty-three days,- "the
sex provision went without challenge, and virtually without mention."26
These facts give rise to a forceful argument which bears on the way
the sex clause should be regarded. The FEP title was omitted from the
early drafts of the Kennedy administration's civil rights bill for
reasons of practicality, not for reasons of principle. Nevertheless, Con-
gress decided that race discrimination was unjust in employment as
well as in voting, public accommodations, and public education; and Ti-
tle VII was added to the law. The title initially lacked a sex clause
because there was no powerful organization like the AFL-CIO to lobby
for the clause and because women were willing to put blacks' needs
ahead of their own. But when it was moved that sex be added to Title
VII, the merits of the motion were obvious, and it was swiftly
adopted.' Indeed, as will appear from the review below of the debate
in the House of Representatives,' "It was difficult for anyone to speak
against the amendment [adding sex] without appearing to favor
discrimination against women, a position politically dangerous and
hard to defend logically."" By adding sex as a protected class along-
side of race, religion, and national origin, Congress recognized that sex
discrimination was a significant problem that deserved as powerful a
sanction as the other kinds of discrimination.
Let us now turn to the arguments that sex was added to Title VII
because Congress thought a sex clause would be a good joke or
because some Congressmen hoped to cripple the civil rights bill.
II. THE DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
As reported by the Judiciary Committee to the House of Represent-
atives on November 20, 1963, Title VII outlawed discrimination on the
24. Judge Howard Smith proposed the amendment to add sex discrimination to Title
VII two days before the House approved the civil rights bill. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964).
See text at section II infra.
25. 110 CONG. REc. 2882-14,511 (1964); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 10 (1970).
26. Miller, supra note 4, at 883.
27. The debate over adding sex to Title VII occupies only seven pages of the Con-
gressional Record, 110 CONG. REc. 2577-84 (1964), and consumed less than two hours of
time, see Miller, supra note 4, at 882.
28. See text at section II infra.
29. Miller, supra note 4, at 881.
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grounds of race, color, religion, and national origin-but not sex." On
February 8, 1964, two days before the House sent the bill to the
Senate, Judge Smith offered from the floor an amendment inserting
the word "sex" after the word "religion" in several clauses of the bill,"
and the amendment was promptly agreed to.2 One can find neither
committee hearing nor report to explain why the amendment was
adopted or what it was intended to do.'
There is some support for the view that Judge Smith intended to
ridicule the bill to death. Upon introducing his amendment, he occa-
sioned great hilarity by reading excerpts from a letter he claimed to
have received from "a lady."' Said Judge Smith:
This lady has a grievance on behalf of the minority sex. She said that she
had seen that I was going to present an amendment to protect the most
important sex, and she says:
I suggest that you might also favor an amendment or a bill to
correct the present "imbalance" which exists between males and
females in the United States.
Then, she goes on to say-and she has her statistics, which is the
reason why I am reading it to you, because this is serious-
The census of 1960 shows that we had 88,331,000 males living in
this country, and 90,992,000 females, which leaves the country with
an "imbalance" of 2,661,000 females.
Just why the Creator would set up such an imbalance of
spinsters, shutting off the "right" of every female to have a husband
of her own, is, of course, known only to nature.
But I am sure you will agree that this is a grave injustice-
And I do agree, and I am reading you the letter because I want all the
rest of you to agree, you of the majority-
But I am sure you will agree that this is a grave injustice to
womankind and something the Congress and President Johnson
should take immediate steps to correct-[laughter].
And you interrupted me just now before I could finish reading the
sentence, which continues on:
immediate steps to correct, especially in this election year.
30. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2391.
31. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964).
32. Id. at 2584.
33. Id at 2582 (remarks of Rep. Green). See also Miller, supra note 4, at 880. The
enigma is compounded when one learns that the House rejected attempts to add sex as a
protected class to the titles on public accommodations, 110 CONG. REC. 1978 (1964), public
facilities, id. at 2265, and public education, id at 2281, and to the charge of the Commis-
sion on Civil Rights, id. at 2297.
34. 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964) (remarks of Reps. Celler and Griffiths).
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Now I just want to remind you here that in this election year it is pretty
nearly half of the voters in this country that are affected, so you had bet-
ter sit up and take notice.
She also says this, and this is a very cogent argument too:
Up until now, instead of assisting these poor unfortunate females
in obtaining their "right" to happiness, the Government has on
several occasions engaged in wars which killed off a large number of
eligible males, creating an "imbalance" in our male and female
population that was even worse than before.
Would you have any suggestions as to what course our Govern-
ment might pursue to protect our spinster friends in their "right" to
a nice husband and family?
I read that letter just to illustrate that women have some real
grievances and some real rights to be protected. I am serious about this
thing. I just hope that the committee will accept it. Now, what harm can
you do this bill that was so perfect yesterday and is so imperfect
today-what harm will this do to the condition of the bill?'
There is also some support for the view that Judge Smith hoped to
disable the bill with amendments. His amendment had no natural
allies., The President's Commission on the Status of Women opposed
adding sex to Title VII27 The Women's Bureau of the Department of
Labor opposed adding sex to Title VII.- The American Association of
University Women opposed adding sex to Title VIL3 9 There was no
testimony in favor of such an amendment before the House Committee
on the Judiciary or the House Committee on Education and Labor. 0
Who, then, favored the Smith amendment? According to Represent-
ative Green of Oregon, it was supported by opponents of Title VII.
Referring to the amendment, Mrs. Green said:
It will clutter up the bill and it may later-very well-be used to help
destroy this section of the bill by some of the very people who today sup-
port it. And I hope that no other amendment will be added to this bill on
35. Id. at 2577.
36. The National Woman's Party may be an exception to this statement. In a letter
evidently written to a number of Congressmen, an excerpt of which was read on the
House floor by Representative May, the national chairman of the Party said:
We are alarmed over the interpretation that may be given to the words
"discrimination on the account of race, color, religion, and national origin" used in
the bill, if the meaning of these words is not made clear in the bill itself. We are in-
formed that in the past some government officials have interpreted "race, color,
religion, and national origin" in a way that has discriminated against the white,
native-born American woman of Christian religion.
Id. at 2582.
37. Id- at 2577 (remarks of Rep. Celler).
38. Id.
39. Id at 2582 (remarks of Rep. Green).
40. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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sex or age or anything else, that would jeopardize our primary purpose in
any way.'
Mrs. Green also argued that race discrimination was a more serious
problem than sex discrimination and that further study was needed
because of the biological differences between men and women. 42
Nevertheless, as constructions of an act of Congress, these conven-
tional explanations of why sex was added to Title VII are inadequate.
They fail because they are inherently unlikely, because they provide
no help in construing the ban on sex discrimination, and because they
do not account for the remarks of Representatives who spoke in favor
of the amendment.
Certainly it is unlikely that Congress put sex into Title VII as "a
mischievous joke."'3 Congress is not known for making jokes into law
(at least, not deliberately), and Title VII was no laughing matter for
Congress or the country. The House may have been amused by the let-
ter from which Judge Smith read, but that is scant evidence from
which to infer that 168 Members of Congress voted for the Smith
amendment because it was a joke.4 As will appear below, there were
serious reasons for voting for the amendment.' 5
It is also unlikely that the majority of the House voted for the
Smith amendment in order to sabotage the bill. If a majority of all
Representatives had truly wanted to defeat the bill, by hypothesis that
majority had the votes to do so directly. Therefore, the most that can
be argued is that the majority that voted for the Smith amendment did
41. 110 CONG. REC. 2581 (1964). See Sirota, note 8 supra as an example of the tradi-
tional reliance upon Representative Green's remarks on congressional intrigue in analyz-
ing the sex discrimination amendment:
On the last day of House debate on the Civil Rights Bill, Representative Smith, a
staunch opponent of the Bill, proposed, in jest, the inclusion of "sex" as a prohibited
classification in an attempt to make the Bill unacceptable to as many legislators as
possible. This strategy resulted in support of the sex amendment by opponents of
sexual equality and opposition to it by many advocates of the Bill, who feared that
Congress would not pass an over-amended bill. Representative Green had argued
that since the primary purpose of Title VII was to prevent employment discrimina-
tion against blacks, Congress should not add "sex" as a prohibited classification
without first holding extensive hearings on possible employment-related biological
differences between men and women. Nevertheless, the House, did not hold hear-
ings, and passed the sex amendment with the support of an unintended coalition of
opponents of the Bill, who voted for the amendment with hopes of defeating the en-
tire Bill, and many pro-Bill liberals, who favored giving women the protection of Ti-
tle VII.
Id. at 1027 (footnotes omitted).
42. 110 CONG. REC. 2581, 2584 (1964).
43. THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 4, 1965, at 101, quoted in Miller, supra note 4, at 884.
44. 110 CONG. REC. 2584 (1964).
45. See text accompanying notes 61-76 infra.
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not represent the views of the House and that this unrepresentative
majority hoped to poison the bill with sex, perhaps calculating that
votes to take sex out of the bill could not be mustered but that, with
sex in the bill, it could not pass. There are two facts which undergird
this argument: First, as noted, 6 Mrs. Green feared the Smith amend-
ment would clutter up the bill, inducing its friends to desert it; second,
most Representatives who spoke in favor of the amendment eventually
voted against the bill."
Nevertheless, there is one fact which completely destroys this argu-
ment: the House actually approved the Smith amendment twice. As
mentioned above, 8 the first vote was held on February 8th. At that
time, the House was sitting as a committee of the whole, so that it
acted informally and its decisions were not binding. Two days later,
the House resolved itself out of committee of the whole for the pur-
pose of voting on the entire bill as amended. Just before the final vote,
Representative Williams of Mississippi exercised his right to demand
another vote on the Smith amendment; the revote was taken, and for
the second time the House approved the amendment. 9 The House then
proceeded to pass the entire bill by a vote of 290 to 130.0 Thus, even if
we assume the majority who voted for the Smith amendment on
February 8th hoped to scuttle the bill, that majority was superseded
by the majority of February 10th. It would be absurd to believe that
the Representatives who approved the Smith amendment on February
10th wanted to impair the very bill which they promptly approved by
an overwhelming margin.51
Besides being unlikely, the conventional explanations of the Smith
amendment provide no basis for construing the ban on sex discrimina-
tion. If Congress put sex in Title VII as a joke or as a strategy that
backfired, what would this tell us about the meaning of the statute?
The possibilities are unsettling. For how should we construe a Con-
gressional joke? Perhaps we should ignore it. How can we find mean-
ing in a strategem that succeeded tactically (sex was added to the bill)
46. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
47. In addition to Judge Smith, those who spoke in favor of the Smith amendment
and voted against the civil rights bill were Representatives Andrews of North Dakota,
Dowdy of Texas, Gary of Virginia, Gathings of Arkansas, Huddleston of Alabama, Pool of
Texas, Rivers of South Carolina, Tuten of Georgia, and Watson of South Carolina. 110
CONG. REc. 2578, 2583, 2584, 2804, 2805 (1964).
48. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
49. 110 CONG. REC. 2804 (1964).
50. Id at 2804-05.
51. It might be argued that the majority which approved the civil rights bill hoped
that Title VII with the sex clause would make the entire bill unacceptable to the Senate,
but this theory would not explain why that same majority did not simply defeat the bill in
the House.
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but failed strategically (the bill passed anyway)? Perhaps we should
conclude that sex was less important to Congress than race and inter-
pret the Act accordingly,52 despite its plain language. 3
Disquieting implications like these can be avoided if we read the
legislative history with two distinctions in mind. First, the reasons
which motivate a legislator to introduce a bill may not be the reasons
the legislature adopts the bill. Thus, perhaps Judge Smith did intend
to torpedo Title VII. Who knows but that he made it even stronger in
the eyes of other Representatives? In fact, it appears that Judge
Smith himself, though opposed to the Civil Rights Act, preferred a bill
with a ban on sex discrimination to a bill without a ban on sex
discrimination: for while he offered no argument in support of his
amendment when he first moved its adoption, after listening to the
debate he argued for the amendment with conviction." Second, we
must distinguish between the reasons a legislator votes for a bill and
what that bill is intended to do. For example, three legislators might
vote in favor of conscription for three different reasons: one might
think a strong army is the best way to avoid war; another might
believe an army is necessary because war is inevitable; and a third
might feel that a war would serve useful purposes at the present time.
Knowledge of these reasons would shed little light on whom the
legislators intended to conscript and whom they intended to exempt.
Similarly, Judge Smith may have been motivated by a desire to cripple
Title VII, but we cannot know from this fact what he intended his
amendment to prohibit: he could have intended the amendment to be
such a broad ban on sex discrimination that other Representatives
52. Sex does receive less protection than race in constitutional cases, as the Supreme
Court has expressly held. "A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is
presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary justification....
[Classifications based upon gender] must bear a close and substantial relationship to im-
portant governmental objectives." Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-73 (1979).
53. To judge from the language of sections 703(a)(1) and (2), sex and race are entitled
to equal protection.
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). But see text at section IV
infra regarding the Bennett Amendment, which some people argue shows Congress in-
tended to protect sex less fully than race.
54. See note 71 and accompanying text infra.
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would recoil from a bill containing it; or he could have intended it to be
such a narrow ban that advocates of women's rights would reject a bill
disgraced by such a paltry measure. If there were an explanation of
the adoption of the Smith amendment which did not rely on unspoken
motives and which helped to interpret the amendment, it would be
superior to the conventional explanations.
Finally, the conventional explanations do not account for the state-
ment of the Representatives who spoke in favor of the Smith amend-
ment, as a review of the debate shows. Following Judge Smith's
reading of the letter in "support" of his amendment,55 Representative
Celler of New York spoke in opposition to the amendment. He
presented his own letter from the Department of Labor, in which the
Assistant Secretary in charge of the Women's Bureau was quoted as
saying that adding sex to Title VII "would not be to the best advan-
tage of women at this time."' Then Judge Smith and Mr. Celler skir-
mished good naturedly, after which Representative Dowdy of Texas
elicited an admission that the letter from which Mr. Celler read had
been signed by a man.57 Representative Bolton of Ohio suggested the
amendment belonged in another title of the bill.- Representative Bass
of Tennessee inquired about discrimination against a young woman
who worked for an airline and wanted to get married. 9 Judge Smith
recurred to Mrs. Bolton's concern." So far, a lackluster debate, signify-
ing nothing.
And then Martha Griffiths rose to speak. It was the lady from
Michigan who played the key role in the debate. Although several
Representatives thereafter joined the discussion, Mrs. Griffiths
presented all of the reasons that were marshaled in favor the Smith
amendment. First, she argued that sex discrimination was real and
deserved a remedy: "In his great work, 'The American Dilemma,' the
Swedish sociologist [Gunnar Myrdal] pointed out 20 years ago that
white women and Negroes occupied relatively the same position in
American society."61 Second, Mrs. Griffiths argued that outlawing race
but not sex discrimination would work to the disadvantage of white
women: "Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment primarily
55. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964); see text accompanying note 36 supra.
56. Id at 2577.
57. Id at 2578 (remarks of Rep. Celler).
58. Id. Mrs. Bolton stated that she would propose an amendment to Title X apparent-
ly on the matter of discrimination based on sex. Id
59. Id (remarks of Rep. Bass).
60. Id Judge Smith described Title X of the bill as a miscellaneous category and
stated, "I think women are entitled to more dignity that that." Id. The bill as enacted,
however, lists Title XI as the title reserved for miscellanea. 42 U.S.C. § 2000h to h6
(1976).
61. 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964).
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because I feel as a white woman when this bill has passed this House
and the Senate and has been signed by the President that white
women will be the last at the hiring gate."62 Apparently, Mrs. Griffiths
reasoned that an employer would not want to reject a white man and
could not legally reject a black, man or woman, thus leaving white
women at the end of the line.13 Finally, Mrs. Griffiths argued that the
bill would offer no protection to black women:
Suppose a Negro woman had been washing dishes in a "greasy spoon," a
very poor restaurant, and farther up the street there was a very good
restaurant which employed only white people, and all the dishwashers
were white men. Suppose they put a sign in the window, "dishwasher
wanted." The Negro woman with experience, qualified, let us suppose, ap-
plied for the job and was turned away....
Suppose the employer said to her, "No, we will not employ you as a
dishwasher. We have only men dishwashers."6'
62. Id.
63. Mrs. Griffiths elaborated at length upon the inefficiency of the Act absent the
word "sex," with regard to working white women. Following various illustrations, both
hypothetical and factual, she stated:
And if you do not add sex to this bill, I really do not believe there is a reasonable
person sitting here who does not by now understand perfectly that you are going to
have white men in one bracket, you are going to try to take colored men and col-
ored women and give them equal employment rights, and down at the bottom of
the list is going to be a white woman with no rights at all.
Now, it has been suggested to me by one Member on the floor that if a job were
repeatedly filled by colored women, that a white woman would be able to invoke
the Federal Employment Practices Act. In my judgment, as long as a majority of
the drivers in a haulaway concern were white drivers, as long as the majority of
employees in the restaurant, in the university, were white people, no white woman
could invoke the act. She will continue to work in the greasy spoon, drive the
schoolbus, and do the other underpaid jobs.
Id. at 2579-80.
64. Id. at 2579. Subsequent to additional colloquy with Representative Celler, Mrs.
Griffiths offered the further example:
Now, when I brought this up with various lawyers on the floor, one of them sug-
gested to me that I was really trying to give a 100-pound woman the right to drive
a haulaway truck. So I got to thinking about it. That is not really what I am trying
to do, but let us take a case. Supposing a little 100-pound colored woman arrives at
the management's door and asks for the job of driving a haulaway truck, and he
says, "Well, you are not qualified," and she says, "Oh, yes, I am. During the war I
was the motorman on a streetcar in Detroit. For the last 15 years I have driven the
schoolbus."
Surely, Mr. Chairman, we are hiring the best drivers to drive the most precious
cargo. Of course, that woman is qualified. But he has only white men drivers. Do
you not know that that woman is not going to have a right under this law? Merely
to ask the question is to answer it.
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Mrs. Griffiths vitalized the debate. As though she had planted fresh
seeds or fertilized dormant ones in their minds, all subsequent
speakers in favor of the amendment took up one or the other of her
first two points. (No one else expressed concern about the plight of the
black woman, who, without the ban on sex discrimination, could not
compete successfully with a white man.)
Representative St. George of New York, the first speaker after Mrs.
Griffiths, opposed Mr. Celler's characterization of the Smith amend-
ment as illogical and inappropriate,'5 and she spoke out strongly
against America's long-standing discrimination against women.'
Representatives Roosevelt of California and Thompson of Georgia rose
in opposition to the Smith amendment, repeating Mrs. Green's
arguments that women's groups did not support adding sex to the bill,
that further study was necessary, and that the bill should not be en-
dangered.17 The next to speak was Representative May of Washington,
who disagreed on two of these points:
I do not think we can ever really assume what is in the mind of any one of
the 435 Members of the House when he offers an amendment or prejudge
any Member on how he intends to vote on a measure .... I just cannot
assume, as [Mrs. Green] has, that the addition of this important amend-
ment, no matter who offers it, will jeopardize this bill ....
Since 1923 more and more Members have offered fan amendment to the
Constitution on equal rights for women], but we have never gotten the
bill out of the Committee on the Judiciary. The League of Women Voters,
some Federated Women's Clubs, the National Federation of Business and
Professional Women have joined the National Woman's Party in con-
sistently asking that wherever laws or Executive Orders exist which for-
bid discrimination on account of race, color, religion, or national origin
that these same laws and orders should also forbid discrimination on ac-
count of sex."
Representative Kelly of New York iterated the theme that sex
65. See id. at 2578 (remarks of Rep. Celler).
66. Id at 2580-81. Said Mrs. St. George:
All you are doing is simply correcting something that goes back, frankly to the
Dark Ages. Because what you are doing is to go back to the days of the revolution
when women were chattels. Of course, women were not mentioned in the Constitu-
tion. They belonged, first of all, to their fathers; then to their husbands or to their
nearest male relative. They had no command over their own property. They were
not supposed to be equal in any way, and certainly they were never expected to be
or believed to be equal intellectually.
The addition of that little, terrifying word "s-e-x" will not hurt this legislation in
any way. In fact it will improve it. It will make it comprehensive. It will make it
logical. It will make it right.
Id. at 2581.
67. Id at 2582; see notes 41 & 42 and accompanying text supra
68. 110 CONG. REC. 2582 (1964).
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discrimination was an evil that deserved to be outlawed, 9 and the next
four speakers harked back to the argument that white women needed
protection if other classes were to be protected. ° Then Judge Smith,
who had not previously offered any reasons in favor of his amendment,
expressed a similar concern for white women:
If the bill is passed there is a provision ... which would require that
every employer in the United States, from General Motors on down to
anyone who employs as many as 25 people, keep an accurate record of all
hiring and firing activities....
I put a question to you in behalf of the white women of the United
States. Let us assume that two women apply for the same job and both of
them are equally eligible, one a white woman and one a Negro woman.
The first thing that the employer will look at [unless the Smith amend-
ment is approved] will be the provision with regard to the records he
must keep. If he does not employ that colored woman and has to make
that record, that employer will say, "Well, now, if I hire the colored
woman I will not be in any trouble, but if I do not hire the colored woman
and hire the white woman, then the [Equal Employment Opportunity] Com-
mission is going to be looking down my throat and will want to know why
I did not. I may be in a lawsuit."
That will happen as surely as we are here this afternoon. You all know
it.71
The intensity of Judge Smith's argument (as compared to his opening
remarks) suggests he was now speaking sincerely and that he genuine-
ly preferred a bill with a ban on sex discrimination to a bill without
such a ban-though, of course, his first preference was no bill at all.
Representative Gary of Virginia associated himself with Judge
Smith,72 and Representative Huddleston of Alabama said that the
Smith amendment would no more weaken the bill than the amendment
allowing women to serve on federal juries had weakened the bill of
1957.73 Representative Watson of South Carolina allied himself with
Judge Smith.7' Then some speakers argued against the amendment,
repeating the arguments Mrs. Green had raised earlier.75 Finally,
Representative Gathings of Arkansas closed the debate by refocusing
on the white woman: "There could be no plausible reason that a white
woman should be deprived of an equal opportunity to get a job simply
because of her sex and a colored woman obtain that position because of
her preferential rights as contained in this bill."7
69. Id. (remarks of Rep. Kelly).
70. Id. at 2583 (remarks of Reps. Tuten, Pool, Andrews, and Rivers).
71. Id. at 2583.
72. Id.
73. Id (referring to the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634).
74. 110 CONG. REC. 2584 (1964).
75. Id. (remarks of Reps. Lindsay, Mathias, and Roosevelt).
76. Id. at 2584.
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We have now accounted for all speakers who favored the Smith
amendment. It is evident they relied on two principal arguments: sex
discrimination was wrong, and white women should not be left at a
disadvantage vis-a-vis black women. These arguments lead to the true
explanation of why Congress added sex to Title VII.
III. THE SCOPE OF THE BAN ON SEX DISCRIMINATION
Contrary to the superficial reading of it by many commentators,"
the House debate is rich in evidence that the Smith amendment was
seriously considered on its merits and not taken simply as a parliamen-
tary ploy. This evidence establishes that sex was added to Title VII
because the Representatives believed the time had come to end sex
discrimination in employment and because they did not want to leave
white women at the end of the hiring line. This explanation of the
Smith amendment is superior to the conventional explanations on all
three of the dimensions discussed above: 8 it derives from the Members
of Congress, it is a probable account, and it provides a basis for con-
struing the ban on sex discrimination.
The explanation offered herein of the Smith amendment comes from
the pages of the Congressional Record; it is not based on reports of
observers, who may or may not have witnessed the debate and inter-
preted it objectively. This explanation is also a highly probable reading
of the mind of the House for two reasons: First, of course, it comes
directly from the mouths of the Representatives. Second, while a ma-
jority of the House would not likely have voted for the Smith amend-
ment on February 10th in order to defeat the civil rights bill and then
immediately have approved that same bill, a majority of the House
could very likely have believed that sex discrimination was unjust and
white women should not be overlooked. This explanation also helps
delineate the scope of the ban on sex discrimination, as the following
discussion shows.
One of the two reasons Congress added sex to Title VII was that
sex discrimination is unjust. We have seen that race discrimination in
77. See, e.g., Foreword, supra note 2, at xi-xii; Developments in the Law: Employ-
ment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109,
1167 (1971); Miller, supra note 4, at 880-82; Sirota, supra note 8, at 1027-28; Vaas, supra
note 12, at 441-42.
Although taking note of those provisions which were proposed but ultimately unsuc-
cessful in becoming part of a bill can be helpful in understanding the legislative purpose
behind a statutory enactment, the conventional explanations of the sex discrimination
clause ask that a successfully enacted provision be understood in terms of a failed and
oblique purpose.
78. See text accompanying notes 43-76 supra.
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employment was a target of Title VII from its inception. 9 When Con-
gress decided that sex discrimination was also an evil, and incor-
porated the ban on sex discrimination into the Act alongside of and
without distinction from the ban on race discrimination (except for the
bona fide occupational qualification clause), it impliedly determined
that the two kinds of discrimination were equally unjust: whatever was
unjust about one was unjust about the other, and whatever should be
done to eliminate one should be done to eliminate the other. It follows
that Congress intended to protect sex as fully as race and the other
classes named in Title VII.
The other reason Congress added sex to Title VII was a fear that a
black woman would enjoy greater protection than a white woman. In a
legal sense, this fear was unjustified. If an employer preferred a black
woman because of her race, a white woman would have had a prima
facie claim for racial discrimination under the bill as it stood before
sex was added to it; Congress had already decided that whites as well
as blacks would be protected by Title VII.80 In a practical sense,
however, the fear for the white woman was realistic enough. As the
debate shows, the Representatives sensed that an employer, choosing
between a black and a white, might lean towards the black because of
a belief that the black would be more likely to sue and win than the
white.
At this point, an element of irrationality enters the discussion. Why
the Representatives thought that adding sex to the Act would protect
white women is a mystery; indeed, adding sex was medicine worse
than the disease, for it not only failed to help white women but, by
helping black women, created a problem for white men. The failure to
help white women is obvious. If an employer prefers one woman over
another, a ban on sex discrimination will (in most cases)" provide no
79. See text accompanying notes 9-21 supra.
80. 110 CONG. REC. 2579 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler). But cf. the comments of Mrs.
Griffiths quoted in note 63 supra. She believed the ban on race discrimination would not
avail a black woman.
81. Cf. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam), in which
the ban on sex discrimination did protect a woman who was rejected in favor of another
woman. The employer refused to hire women with preschool-aged children, but imposed
no similar requirement on men. Id at 543. Accordingly, the plaintiff, who had preschool-
aged children, was rejected, while women without such children were hired. The Supreme
Court found sex discrimination because applicants of like qualifications are entitled to
employment opportunities irrespective of sex. Of course, the gist of the case is that men
were treated more favorably than women, though some women also benefitted from the
policy. However, if the employer had applied its rule about preschool-aged children to
both sexes, or if the employer had a lawful reason to hire only women for the job in ques-
tion, the plaintiff might well have lost her case.
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recourse to the rejected applicant. As for white men, Mrs. Griffiths
pointed out that, without the sex amendment, a black woman could not
compete effectively with a white man because an employer who re-
jected the woman because of her race and chose the man because of
his, could argue that his reason was sex, not race. Thus, the addition of
sex to the bill gave black women the same "advantage" over white
men which they enjoyed over white women.
That the Smith amendment did not accomplish what it purported to
accomplish amounts to an argument that its real purpose was
something else, such as an attempt to defeat the bill. That the Smith
amendment exposed white men to a risk from which they would other-
wise have been safe tends to support this argument: for, once the
Representatives realized what they had done, they might have shied
away from the FEP title altogether. On the other hand, it is much
more likely that Judge Smith and others did not think through the im-
plications in the foregoing paragraph. They were sincere in their
desire to protect the white woman. They were convinced by Mrs. Grif-
fiths' argument that the white woman would be at the bottom of the
hiring list, and they saw the ban on sex discrimination as the means to
prevent that result. Whether or not readers agree on this point, surely
they will agree that what Judge Smith believed is not controlling.
What other Representatives believed is important, and nothing in the
Congressional Record suggests that any Representative realized the
flaws in the Judge's argument.
Accepting, then, that Congress adopted the Smith amendment in
order to protect white women against a kind of unfair competition
from black women, we see that the ban on sex discrimination was
meant to be a shield against the sword of the ban on race discrimina-
tion. It is reasonable to conclude the shield was meant to be as effec-
tive as the sword. If the bill without the Smith amendment was
perceived to give black women an advantage over white women
because of employers' fears of being sued by black women, and if the
purpose of the Smith amendment was to rectify this imbalance, surely
the ban on sex discrimination must have been intended to give
employers equal reason to fear a suit by white women. It follows from
this purpose, as it does from the purpose to end sex discrimination,
that Congress intended to protect sex as fully as race.
A correct understanding of the legislative history of the Smith
amendment serves to rebut notions that Congress was joking about
sex or was duped by a wily Southern Representative. Congress had
good and sufficient reasons to add sex to Title VII. Acknowledging
those reaons is important to proper analysis of issues of sex
discrimination. One such issue is comparable worth.
1981
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IV. AN APPLICATION TO THE ISSUE OF COMPARABLE WORTH
Is a tree trimmer entitled to higher pay than a registered nurse?
Should a guard in a jail be paid more than a matron? These questions
raise no issues under the Equal Pay Act"2 because the jobs are dif-
ferent; but if the tree trimmers and guards are predominately men
and the nurses and matrons are predominately women, an issue may
arise under Title VII. The issue has become known as comparable
worth, and it may be posed thus: Did Congress intend Title VII to
outlaw an employer's compensating a male job more highly than a
female job if the reason for the pay differential is the sex of the
women? The reasons that sex was added to Title VII do not fully
answer this question, but they contribute to the discussion, when the
employer's discrimination is purposeful.
The Smith amendment was adopted for two reasons: the House
believed that sex discrimination in employment was unjust and desired
to protect white women in the job market." Based on these reasons, it
was argued that Congress intended to protect women against sex
discrimination as fully as it intended to protect blacks against race
discrimination (except where sex is a bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion for a job). This argument affects comparable worth because it is
obvious that a black would state a claim under Title VII if he alleged
that he was paid less for his job than a white was paid for his job, and
the employer's reason was the race of the black. That would be
discrimination in compensation because of race, which section 703(a)(1)
of Title VII expressly forbids." If sex is as fully protected as race, a
woman would state a claim under Title VII if she alleged that she was
paid less for her job than a man was paid for his job, and the
employer's reason was the sex of the woman. However, it is common-
ly argued, and it has been held, ' that Congress intended a different
82. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
83. See text at section III supra.
84. The language of section 703(a) is quoted at note 53 supra. See also 110 CONG. REC.
5812 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Stennis).
85. As will be discussed, see text accompanying notes 86-102 infra, the extent of the
protection given to sex by Title VII turns on whether the Bennett amendment to those
provisions, 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2(h) (1976), incorporated the Equal Pay Act's equal work for-
mula, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976), into the Title VII prohibitions, or simply the Equal Pay
Act's four affirmative defenses and not its equal work standard, id. If the former, then in
order to establish a case under Title VII, it must be proved that a wage difference was
based on sex and that there was the performance of equal work for unequal compensation.
See, e.g., Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 244 (1980); Orr v. Frank R. MacNeill & Son Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975). If the latter, then Title VII is broader in scope than the Equal
Pay Act and other wage discrimination situations may be held violative of Title VII's pro-
hibitions. See, e.g., International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC
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kind of protection for sex than for race. The basis of this argument is
the Bennett amendment, which was added to Title VII in the Senate
shortly before the bill was approved and sent back to the House." The
Bennett amendment was an addition to section 703(h). The amendment
read:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this title for any
employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount
of the wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such
employer if such differentiation is authorized by the provisions of section
6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended (29 U.S.C.
206(d)).8
Section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (the Equal Pay
Act) reads in relevant part:
No employer ... shall discriminate ... between employees on the basis
of sex by paying wages to employees ... at a rate less than the rate at
which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex ... for equal work
on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and respon-
sibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except
where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit
system; (iii) system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of
production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than
sex ....
It has been argued that the Bennett amendment was meant to exempt
from Title VII any sex-related pay differential not outlawed by the
Equal Pay Act; that Congress rejected comparable worth as a theory
under the Equal Pay Act; and, therefore, that comparable worth is not
a legitimate theory under Title VII. It has been counterargued that the
Bennett amendment was meant only to prevent Title VII from en-
croaching on the exceptions to the Equal Pay Act; that comparable
worth does not affect those exceptions; and, therefore, that comparable
worth is a cognizable theory under Title VII. Although the legislative
history of the Bennett amendment cannot provide a complete answer
to the issues raised by these arguments, it can shed considerable light
on them.
If the Bennett amendment were intended to reserve all sex-related
pay differential cases for the Equal Pay Act, the Senate would have
significantly altered the ban on sex discrimination. In effect, in com-
pensation cases there would have been one definition of discrimination
for sex and a different, broader definition for all other classes: any pay
differential caused by an employee's race, color, religion, or national
origin would have been illegal, but a pay differential caused by an
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980); Gunther v. County of
Washington, 602 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1979), affd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (1981).
86. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,647 (1964).
87. Id.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
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employee's sex would have been illegal only if the man and woman did
equal work requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility under
similar working conditions. Consider, for example, an employer who
paid a man doubletime wages for overtime work, but paid a woman do-
ing different work only time-and-a-half for overtime. Did the Senate in-
tend that women should have no cause of action on these facts? Did
the Senate intend to narrow Title VII's protection of women? A
number of reasons suggest otherwise.
First, nothing said on the floor of the Senate indicates, or even
hints, that the purpose of the Bennett amendment was to redefine the
nature of sex discrimination. Only three Senators spoke on the amend-
ment. The first was Senator Bennett himself. It is clear that he was
concerned, not with narrowing the ban on sex discrimination, but with
protecting the integrity of the Equal Pay Act:
Mr. President, after many years of yearning by members of the fair sex in
this country, and after careful study by the appropriate committees of
Congress, last year Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act which
became effective only yesterday.
By this time, programs have been established for the effective ad-
ministration of this act. Now, when the civil rights bill is under considera-
tion, in which the word "sex" has been inserted in many places, I do not
believe sufficient attention may have been paid to possible conflict be-
tween the wholesale insertion of the word "sex" in the bill and the Equal
Pay Act.
The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event of con-
flicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified."
The second speaker was Senator Humphrey; he merely said the
amendment was helpful.0 The final speaker was Senator Dirksen, who
explained the limited scope of the Bennett amendment:
We were aware of the conflict that might develop, because the Equal
Pay Act was an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fair
Labor Standards Act carries out certain exceptions.
All that the pending amendment does is recognize those exceptions,
that are carried in the basic act.
Therefore, this amendment is necessary, in the interest of
clarification."
The foregoing comments clearly reveal that the Senate was not bent
on limiting the scope of the ban on sex discrimination. Rather, the Ben-
nett amendment was meant simply and solely to prevent Title VII
from vitiating the exceptions to the Equal Pay Act, which had been
passed just one year earlier.
89, 110 CONG. REC. 13,647 (1964).
90. Id
91. Id
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This conclusion is further supported by the identity of the speakers
and by the absence of other speakers. Senator Humphrey was one of
the floor managers of the civil rights bill, 2 and Senator Dirksen, at
that time the minority leader, engineered the compromise that insured
passage of the bill. 3 These Senators' complete acceptance of the
amendment suggests that Senator Bennett had previously consulted
with them and, very likely after discussing it with other Senators, they
had agreed to it. If the purpose of the amendment had been a major
change, such as narrowing the ban on sex discrimination, rather than a
minor change, such as preserving the exceptions to the Equal Pay Act,
Humphrey and Dirksen might not have embraced the amendment so
readily, and other Senators (for example, Margaret Chase Smith and
Maureen Neuberger) would surely have risen to decry the betrayal of
women.
Another indication that the Senate did not intend to narrow Title
VII's protection of women flows from the reasons the House added sex
to the civil rights bill. The House believed that sex discrimination in
employment was unjust and desired to protect white women in the job
market." To read the Bennett amendment to take sex-based compensa-
tion cases out of Title VII is to impute to the Senate a renunciation of
both of the reasons for which the House agreed to the sex clause: for
such a reading would permit blatant forms of sex discrimination to per-
sist and would poke a large hole in the shield the House fashioned for
white women. A few obvious examples will suffice to illustrate the ex-
tent to which sex discrimination in compensation could persist if only
the Equal Pay Act applied.
One case is the common practice of compensating certain jobs less
than others because women tend to hold the former. 5 If the women's
jobs involve different work from the men's jobs, an employer could
lawfully reduce the women's pay even further, and raise the men's
pay-and admit his reason was the employees' sexes-without offend-
ing the Equal Pay Act. Another case is the employer with a unique
job. He is free under the Equal Pay Act to say, "Miss Jones, I am glad
you are a woman because I would have to pay a man twice your salary
to do your work." A third case is the employer with two
establishments; the Equal Pay Act permits him to pay a man at one
establishment more than a woman at the other establishment, even
92. Id. at 13,663 (remarks of Sen. Randolph).
93. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII
AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 10 (1970); see Foreword, supra note 2, at xii.
94. See text at section III supra
95. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 410-15 (1979).
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though their work is identical." Finally, as mentioned above, the Equal
Pay Act would not reach the case of an employer who paid a man
doubletime wages for overtime work, but paid a woman doing a dif-
ferent job only time-and-a-half for overtime.
Did the Senate intend to condone these practices? Absolutely
nothing in the Congressional Record suggests the Senate wanted to
allow them. Without a clear signal to the contrary, we should not light-
ly attribute such a purpose to a body that was so concerned with the
rights of blacks, Hispanics, and other disadvantaged groups.
As for the hole in the shield, consider the case of a black woman
who holds a job for which she feels she is underpaid. If she can prove
that she is in fact underpaid, she may well prevail against her
employer on a claim of race discrimination. Suppose a white feels she
is underpaid. If the Bennett amendment precludes a comparable worth
theory, the white woman will have no case. Now look at the situation
(as did several Members of the House) from the viewpoint of the
employer. He knows if he pays a black woman less than she thinks she
deserves, she can sue him and she might win; he also knows if he pays
a white woman less than she thinks she deserves, she has no legal
recourse. Therefore, the employer's first thought might be to hire a
white woman and underpay her. (Could the Senate have meant to allow
this?) But the employer's second thought would be that, if he hires the
white woman, he will be sued for race discrimination by the black
woman, so his only alternative is to hire the black woman-and pay
her what she wants-in order to forestall a lawsuit. Surely the Senate
did not intend the Bennett amendment to have such an effect. It
follows that the theory of comparable worth under Title VII is essen-
tial to keep intact the protection the House extended to white women.
At the same time, the Bennett amendment must be given its due. It
says an employer may differentiate in compensation on the basis of sex
if the differentiation is authorized by the Equal Pay Act." The Equal
Pay Act can be read to authorize any pay practice it does not outlaw,
or it can be read to authorize only those pay practices which fall
within one of its exceptions. 8 The latter reading is the more plausible.
To authorize is to invest with right or power; at a minimum, it is to ap-
prove. If Congress outlaws one thing, it does not make everything else
right, nor does it approve everything else; it simply fails to speak
about those things. But if Congress outlaws one thing, and then ex-
cepts something specific from the law, it definitely has approved and
given a right to exist to that specific thing. Accordingly, the Equal Pay
96. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976); see text accompanying note 87 supra.
98. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976); see text accompanying note 88 supra.
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Act authorizes a pay differential between men and women only if (a)
they are doing "equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility . . . under similar working condi-
tions" and (b) the differential is paid "pursuant to (i) a seniority
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) . . . any other factor other
than sex .... -99 On this reading, the Bennett amendment says nothing
more than that Title VII does not destroy the exceptions to the Equal
Pay Act. Of course, Title VII could not affect the Equal Pay Act's ex-
ceptions unless the rule of that law came into play. The rule of that
law applies to compensation for "equal work on jobs the performance
of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are
performed under similar working conditions."1 0 Comparable worth
cases are entirely different; they involve different jobs, not similar
jobs. It follows that the Bennett amendment has no bearing on the
issue of comparable worth.
This reading of the Bennett amendment is confirmed by its
legislative history. Senator Bennett suggested the scope of his amend-
ment when he said, "[I]n the event of conflicts, the provisions of the
Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified."'' ° It would be helpful to know
what kind of conflicts the Senator had in mind, but he did not il-
lustrate his statement. Nevertheless, we can know what the Senate
understood the relevant conflicts to be, for Senator Dirksen said, "All
that the pending amendment does is to recognize those exceptions,
that are carried in the [Equal Pay Act]."'O' Evidently, the conflicts the
Senate feared would occur in cases in which Title VII might be inter-
preted to override the exceptions to the Equal Pay Act. Clearly, such
conflicts could only occur in cases to which both Title VII and the
Equal Pay Act apply. Such conflicts could not occur, of course, in cases
to which only one of the statutes applies. Because the Equal Pay Act
does not reach comparable worth cases, which involve different jobs,
and therefore no conflict is possible between Title VII and the Equal
Pay Act, in regard to such jobs, the Bennett amendment does not af-
fect the theory of comparable worth.
Curiously, the Senate may have been as irrational about the Bennett
amendment as the House was about the Smith amendment. The
Senate's concern-that, without the Bennett amendment to preserve
the exceptions to the Equal Pay Act, Title VII might have been con-
strued to outlaw employers' practices the Equal Pay Act permit-
99. Id.
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ted-may have been unfounded. As it stood before the Bennett amend-
ment, section 703(h) contained language that, when read together with
section 703(a), could have been interpreted to achieve the same pur-
pose as the Bennett amendment. But, just as the House thought a sex
clause was necessary to protect white women, the Senate thought the
Bennett amendment was necessary to protect the exceptions to the
Equal Pay Act. Once again our legislators acted quickly, without suffi-
cient reflection, and their logic may have been questionable, but their
intent was clear.
V. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE SMITH AND BENNETT AMENDMENTS
Not only does the Smith amendment suggest how to interpret the
Bennett amendment, but also the Bennett amendment suggests how to
interpret the Smith amendment. That is, we have just seen that the
reasons the House agreed to the sex clause influence how we should
understand the Bennett amendment; 3 now we are able to see that the
debate on the Bennett amendment confirms our understanding of the
reasons why the House agreed to the sex clause.
If the House added sex to Title VII as a joke or a strategem to en-
cumber the civil rights bill, the first real consideration of the effect of
a ban on sex discrimination would have taken place in the Senate, and
the Bennett amendment-which is the Senate's only discussion of sex
discrimination in the Congressional Record-could have been the
Senate's attempt to define the degree of protection to be afforded
women. On the other hand, if the House added sex to the bill for
serious and weighty reasons, the Bennett amendment should be seen
as refining, rather than defining, the ban on sex discrimination. Con-
versely, if the Bennett amendment had sparked significant debate on
the nature of sex discrimination, such debate would be consistent with
the view that the Senate knew the House had not been serious about
the sex clause. But if the Bennett amendment were adopted without
opposition or discussion, this fact would suggest the Senate was
satisfied with the House's deliberation on the issues.
The very brief debate on the Bennett amendment, quoted almost in
full above,1"' demonstrates that the Bennett amendment was not a
vehicle for the Senate to decide whether sex discrimination ought to
be outlawed by Title VII. Apparently, by the time the amendment was
offered, the Senate had accepted as settled the House's decision to in-
clude sex in the bill. This acceptance rebuts the notion that the House
added sex to the Act without legitimate reasons. This acceptance also
103. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
104. See text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
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suggests the Senate was substantially satisfied with the House's
balancing of the relevant interests, that is, with the House's deter-
mination to protect sex as fully as race, religion, and national origin.
Thus, the legislative histories of the Smith and Bennett amendments
complement one another. The House agreed to the Smith amendment
to eradicate sex discrimination in employment and to protect white
women. The Senate accepted the House's decision to add sex to the
civil rights bill, but added the Bennett amendment to prevent impair-
ment of the Equal Pay Act. Recognizing a cause of action under Title
VII for purposeful sex discrimination in compensation would not dilute
the Equal Pay Act because the latter statute would remain the con-
trolling authority in cases to which both statutes apply. However,
refusing to recognize a cause of action for purposeful sex discrimina-
tion in compensation would seriously erode the congressional purpose
to protect women as the other classes covered by Title VII. The pur-
poses of the Smith and Bennett amendments can be realized only if all
purposeful sex discrimination can be redressed under Title VII or the
Equal Pay Act.
EDITOR'S NOTE: Shortly before this article went to press, the Supreme Court decided
County of Washington v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (1981). Although its decision was based
on other arguments, the Court reached the conclusion, as does the author in section IV of
this article, that the Bennett amendment was not meant to preclude a Title VII action to
redress sex discrimination in compensation if the discrimination was purposeful.
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